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Abstract
The main argument of this paper is that language, like cognition, is basically intensional, i.e.
expression of thoughts. The philosophical and logicai consequences of this view are discussed
and partly elaborated. The paper implies a fundamental critique of the study of language dur-
ing the 20th Century, which failed to recognize the essential cognitive (intensional) nature of
language. A plea is made for a re-appraisal of late 19th Century approaches in philosophy (e.g.
Meinong, Stout), which are said to have been on the right track though lacking in formal
precision. The 20th Century extensional view of logic and language, which goes back to the
early 1900s, is subjected to a fundamental critique. The intensional nature of language is shown
to have far-reaching consequences for the theory of grammar and meaning. The formal gram-
matical and semantic theories developed during the 20th Century frorn an extensional point of
view are best seen äs a prelude to more adequate intensional formal theories.
1. Introduction
This paper is a result of my long-standing conviction that during the twentieth
Century theoretical linguistics has suffered from one overarching defect, the
neglect of cognition äs a constitutive element in the make-up of natural lan-
guage. There have, of course, been many positive developments äs well. As a
subject, linguistics has taken an enormous flight, resulting in vastly superior
knowledge of the languages of the world, their common features and their
differences. Our observational powers in the areas of syntax, morphology, pho-
nology and phonetics have been considerably sharpened. Our insights into the
nature of dialectal and sociolectal Variation have been extended and deepened,
and more real progress could be mentioned. On the formal front, the last Century
has witnessed dramatically improved mathematical insights into the nature of
formal languages and, helped by developments in logic, corresponding dramatic
improvements of the formal means of analysis and description of complex
structures of Symbols and their model-theoretic properties. All that has been,
and is, of great Service. Yet something serious has been lacking, and that, I
think, is a formal and philosophical account of the dependency of natural
language on cognition.
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Exactly one hundred years ago, insights were coming to fruition regarding
the projective powers of the human mind in dealing with the world and getting
to know about it (e.g. Meinong 1904), and, at the same time, the cognitively
dynamic nature of human language (e.g, Stout 1896). But hardly any satis-
factory progress has been made, in the meantime, regarding the formal analysis
and description of the cognitive or intensional processes involved. In principle,
the technical notions that were developed in logic and mathematics during the
twentieth Century were limited to Systems that were in principle extensional,
leaving the projective powers of cognition unaccounted for.
Given both the possibilities and the limitations of such extensional Systems,
the tendency was to maximize their use and cut the object of enquiry down to
their size. Language, in other words, was tied to the Procrustean bed of the
formal Systems available and maimed in the process. Those who did not want to
take part in this disfiguring formal treatment inevitably found themselves
relegated to a less respected limbo of vagueness and imprecision. In the case of
pragmatics, imprecise and intuition-based analyses were used to rescue langu-
age from being crippled too badly by the imposition of an inadequate logical
and model-theoretic System. It is my feeling that what is wanted in the present
Situation is a bridge between, on the one hand, the kind of formal treatment we
have, for good reasons, grown used to and the still largely unexplored domains
of mind and thought, on the other.
The overall landscape of linguistic interaction äs it will be sketched in the
following pages is still füll of unmapped areas, like our planet a few centuries
ago. It seems premature and unwise, therefore, to Jump to formalizations, even
if some among our colleagues, especially those with a training in formal logic,
feel that only fully formalized theories can make a contribution to science.
These logicians or logically minded linguists are wrong, and their unwise atti-
tude explains a great deal of the theoretical myopia we have unfortunately had
to witness during the last Century. Formalization is the last step in a long pro-
cess of finding one's feet and getting one's bearings, of cautious exploration
and ground testing, of becoming familiär with the object of enquiry and dis-
covering possible generalizations and causal connections. Those who insist on
füll formalization straight away show that they have little idea of what real
science amounts to.
On the other hand, however, those who reject any attempt at formalization are
equally unwise. One of the important lessons of the past Century has been that
marshalling one's findings into a formal System, either äs a data survey or äs a
formal theory with predictive power, is the indispensable cap on all serious
research. The mathematical turn of the last Century has led to such improvements
in the clarity and systematicity of thinking in the traditional human sciences that
it can no longer be rejected with impunity. A sensible middle course should,
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therefore, be followed. On the one band, the available facts should be scrutinized
äs completely and äs impartially äs is feasible given the circumstances. On the
other hand, the results should, at the right moment, be cast into the format of a
formal survey or theory, whereby the formal sciences of logic and mathematics
should be called in for help äs much and äs quickly äs possible.
2. The semiotic architecture
Let us start with the famous semiotic triangle in Ogden & Richards (1923:11),
shown in fig. 1. Their book, The Meaning ofMeaning, of 1923, is a curious but
also very inspiring struggle between the forces of the 19th and those of the 20th
Century. On the one hand, the authors have not yet taken leave of the notion of
thought, a notion that was of prime importance in the study of language and
logic during the 19th Century. On the other hand, they wrestle with the then
modern developments of pragmatism, neopositivism and even behaviourism.
Despite the confusions, uncertainties and other great inadequacies, largely due
to the limited technical and formal means at their disposal, their triangle of
semiotic relations was a masterful synthesis of their thoughts on the subject, a
synthesis that should have inspired the 20th Century philosophers of language
much more than it did.
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Figure 1: Ogden & Richards's semiotic triangle
To adapt the terminology to the present day, we read 'linguistic utterance' where
Ogden & Richards read 'symboP. Where they read 'thought or reference' we read
simply 'thought' or, if you like, 'mind', and for their 'referent' we read 'world'.
We then see that the authors see a causal relation of 'symbolisation' between
utterance and thought: the former is a rule-governed expression of the latter,
while the latter is a reconstruction guided by the former, both processes being
subject to causal mechanisms within the speaker's body, mind and all. This
much is easily understood and subscribed to by modern linguists (to the extent
that they subscribe to a realist Interpretation of their theories).
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We also notice that Ogden & Richards establish another causal relation or
set of relations between the mind and the world, in an attempt to account for the
relation between thoughts and what they are about. We speak here of an inten-
tional relation, that is, the relation between, on the one hand, mental represen-
tations and whatever linguistic or artistic structures that go proxy for them, and,
on the other, those aspects in the real or any imagined world that the' re-
presentations are meant to be about. Intentionality, in short, is the represen-
tational character, the 'aboutness', of thoughts and their symbolizations.
This intentional relation we find much more problematic. In fact, hardly
anything substantial has been said during the 20th Century about the inten-
tionality of thought and language, that is, about the fact that the use of language
is intended to be about things in the or a world. This, of course, must be a
central issue in any theory of meaning and I shall argue that the Standard
answers provided by modern semantic theory are, though of consummate for-
mal and technical prowess, badly lacking in adequacy.
This point is directly connected with the third line in Ogden & Richards's
triangle, the base line. This is not a solid but a dotted line, signalling the fact
that it does not express a causal but, äs the authors say, an 'imputed' relation.
We take the authors to mean by this that in describing the relation between
linguistic utterances and the world we behave äs if this were a direct causal
relation, even if we know that this is not so.
This, now, is a profoundly misleading perspective which has, in my view,
been one of the main sources of error not only in modern semantics and
philosophy of language, but also in the very conceptual frame determining the
ordinary linguist's view of language. Both the origins and the consequences of
this misleading perspective go deep and are not always directly visible, but they
are all-pervasive and therefore of the greatest importance for the overall direc-
tion of research and the Interpretation of its results. In incorporating the dotted
base line into their triangle, Ogden & Richards tried to reconcile the irrecon-
cilable. The proper scientific perspective, äs I see it, is expressed more ade-
quately by an emendation of Ogden and Richards's triangle äs shown in fig. 2.
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Figure 2: The causal relationships of language, mind and world
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In this view, there is a non-isomorphic relation between sentence structures
and thought structures (the latter to be reconstructed by hypothesis on the basis
of semantic and grammatical phenomena together with situational and world
knowledge). In principle, the grammar of each language maps actual thought
structures onto sentence structures and vice versa. Then, thought structures
(mental representations) not only have a truth value with regard to what they are
about in the world, but, equally essentially, embody a socially binding com-
mitment on the part of the speaker/writer with regard to the proposition
contained in the thought and expressed in the uttered sentence.
When we speak of the Interpretation ofan uttered sentence, we speak of its
property of revealing to a comprehending listener/reader with close to füll cer-
tainty what thought, corresponding with the uttered sentence, has occurred in
the speaker/writer's mind. That thought has at least two main aspects. It con-
tains a commitment on the part of the speaker/writer with regard to a propo-
sition. We take 'proposition' here in an old-fashioned, even Aristotelian, sense:
a proposition consists ofthe mental assignment of a property to one or more
(real or imagined) entities. Such a mental assignment is either true or false:
propositions are the primary bearers of truth values. On the other hand, the
commitment specifies the kind of social responsibility the speaker/writer has
decided to take on with respect to the proposition at hand by uttering the
thought. Fig. 3 shows this more detailed architecture of the semiotic environ-
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Clearly, what is contained in fig. 3 constitutes an enormous research pro-
gramme. Unfortunately, one has to say that most of this programme is still to be
carried out, and that most of what has been achieved in the 20th Century, though
extremely useful in a formal or technical sense, is misguided in that it seeks to
elaborate a non-existent ('imputed') direct relation between surface structure
and whatever is the case in the or a world. In the following section we will
investigate some of the historical roots of this unhappy state of affairs.
3. Logical semantics: the Principle of Extensionality
During the twentieth Century, the human sciences have been characterized by a
drive for scientific and formal precision, together with a fear for mental pheno-
mena, in that order. This is precisely what we find not only in linguistics but
also, and in a more pronounced form, in the 20th Century developments in logic
and semantics.
As far äs I have been able to ascertain, the crucial mathematical turn in
logic and semantics happened in the early years of the last Century, although
there had been half a Century of preparatory developments. Around the year
1903 Russell, one of the fathers of modern logic, was struggling with his
ontology. He tried, but failed, to understand his contemporaries Gottlob Frege
and Alexius Meinong (äs he failed to understand Aristotle's ontology). Yet he
wrote repeatedly about Meinong, first praising (l903[37]), later attacking him
(1905a, 1905b), in either case, however, without understanding him properly.
By 1905 he had attained greater clarity in his thoughts about ontology (although
his criterion of extensionality lacked clarity; äs is shown in 6.2 below), and had
opted for a strictly extensional universe, that is (in our terms), a universe
consisting exclusively of entities that play their part in a System of physical
causes and effects. He banned from his ontology all intensional entities, i.e.
entities that are conjured up by human Imagination, such äs Sherlock Holmes or
the Abominable Snowman, or mermaids and unicorns (see 6.2 below for further
comment). But in 1903, when he published his Principles ofMathematics, there
was still considerable confusion.2 Two passages in this book show the struggle,
and the incompatibility, of RusselFs thoughts on the subject. Early on in the
book, on p. 33, he declares his antipsychologism in logic in the following terms:
In the discussion of inference, it is common to permit the intrusion of a psychological
element, and to consider our acquisition of new knowledge by its means. But it is
plain that where we validly infer one proposition from another, we do so in virtue of
a relation which holds between the two propositions whether we perceive it or not:
the mind, in fact, is äs purely receptive in inference äs common sense supposes it to
be in perception of sensible objects. The relation in virtue of which it is possible for
us validly to infer is what I call material implication. (italics mine)
(Russell 1903[37]:33)
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One notes first that Russell assigns some sort of independent Status to
propositions, äs if a proposition could be there independently of the human,
being conceiving it—a notion worked out in greater detail, but still lacking in
force, in Frege (1918). Then, more importantly, one sees that the mind is said to
be no more than a passive transfer passage between the world and the logical
language. Russell is, however, apparently unaware that this rejection of the 'psy-
chological element' in logical deduction is incompatible with an ontology that
assigns being, but not existence, to intensional entities, that is, to objects of
thought. On p. 449 of the same book he writes, inspired by Meinong:
Being is that which belongs to every conceivable term, to every possible object of
thought—in short to everything that can possibly occur in any proposition, true or
false, and to all such propositions themselves. ... "A is not" must always be either
false or meaningless. For if A were nothing, it could not be said not to be. ...
Numbers, the Homeric gods, relations, chimeras and four-dimensional spaces all have
being, for if they were not entities of a kind, we could make no propositions about
them. Thus being is a general attribute of everything, and to mention anything, is to
show that it is.... Existence, on the contrary, is the prerogative of some only amongst
beings. To exist is to have a specific relation to existence—a relation, by the way,
which existence itself does not have. (Russell 1903[37]:449)
There is a hidden conflict between these two passages. A logic without psy-
chology can only be based on a notion of truth that is restricted to properties of
really existing entities and cannot take into account anything äs intangible and
shadowy äs 'things' that do not exist but owe their being to their having merely
been thought up or imagined. Such a logic works well for mathematics, äs the
elements occurring in mathematical structures are never themselves equipped
with powers of Imagination (though the mathematician himself clearly is), and
also for those applications where only really existing entities are at issue.
The kind of logic Russell was after was of the mathematical kind, mainly
because his primary concern was the foundations of mathematics, and not the
semantics of natural language, which, for him, was no more than a testing
ground enlivened by handicaps that might occasionally be interesting.3 The
logic Russell envisaged is based on the axiom of identity (every entity is
identical to itself and different from any other entity), and the axiom of
consistency (no state of affairs can both be the case and not be the case at the
same time). It moreover restricts itself to an ontology where only really existing
entities, with their proper identity, have a place.4 Logical Systems that exclude
thought-up entities and stay within the axioms of identity and consistency are
subject to the Principle of Extensionality. The worlds to which they are
applicable are extensional worlds.
Objects of thought' cannot play a role in an extensional logic since thought-
up objects and worlds are not per se subject to the axioms of identity and
consistency that hold for the world of existing entities. Thoughts and thought-
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up objects often stray beyond the constraints of identity and consistency that
charaeiterize extensional logical Systems, and they do so to different degrees.
Dreams, for example, tend to violate the Principle of Extensionality more dras-
tically than scientific hypotheses. Such phenomena have to be accounted for: to
the extent that dreams or scientific hypotheses are expressible in language, they
must have their semantics. To impose the Principle of Extensionality upon
thoughts and objects of thought is to mutilate the object of enquiry. For Russell,
however, the inclusion of thoughts and thought-up objects meant a mutilation of
his object of enquiry.
By 1905 Russell had discovered the incompatibility between his logical
ideals and his ontology, and had made his choice. In his (1905a) he clearly opts
for the non-psychological concept of logic, rejecting the distinction between
being and existence. From now on, his logic is strictly extensional: there is no
place for intensional, merely thought-up entities such äs Atlantis or Pegasus.
Existence and being are equated: if I talk about Pegasus there is nothing I talk
about; therefore I talk about nothing. The alternative view, namely that in
talking about Pegasus I talk about something that does not exist, and thus talk
about something, though still defended in Russell (1903), is dismissed two years
later. Since then, intensional entities have been in general disrepute, boosted by
Quine's rhetorical blast (1953:1-19) against them.
Russell's change of mind between 1903 and 1905 is particularly evident in
his attitude towards the philosophy of Alexius Meinong. Whereas, in his Prin-
ciples of Mathematics of 1903, Russell is füll of appreciation for Meinong,
whom he quotes frequently and with approval, his review (1905b) is decidedly
negative, and his famous (1905a) even dismissive. However, RusselFs criti-
cisms in (1905a) and (1905b) are largely based on terminological equivoca-
tions, äs he misunderstands and confuses Meinong's distinction between 'being'
(bestehen), 'existing' (existieren) and 'subsisting' (subsistieren), and implicitly
restricts what he calls 'things' to 'existing things' (1905a:485), whereas in a
more Meinongian universe 'things' include 'non-existing things' äs well.5
4. Possible world semantics
Be that äs it may, the strictly extensional view of logic has prevailed during the
whole of the 20th Century and has also placed a decisive stamp on formal
theories of meaning in natural language. During the 1960s logic began to be
applied to the semantics of natural language. This development is known äs
model-theoretic or possible world semantics. It was directly based on the work
of the American logician Richard Montague6 and was an offshoot of the 'se-
mantic movement* in logic, where model-theory was developed from the 1930s
on äs a new method of testing logical Systems and proving theorems.
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Realizing that reference to intensional entities is an integral part of natural
language, Montague developed a System of 'possible worlds' or PWs, each PW
being an alternative to the actual or real world in which we live. He generalized
extensional logic to all possible worlds, so that each PW can be treated by an
extensional logic for it. This is called the programme of extensionalization of
intensions. In each PW a term t of a language L has äs its extension either an
entity or set of entities, or t lacks a value; a predicate P of £ has a set (possibly
the null set) of term extensions äs its extension; a sentence S of L has a truth
value (T for 'true', or ' for 'false') äs its extension. Intensions are then
defined äs functions frorn PWs to extensions. Thus, the intension of a term t of
L is a function frorn all PWs to the extension of t in each PW. Likewise for
predicates and sentences: the intension of a predicate P of L is a function from
all PWs to the extension of P in each PW, and the intension of a sentence S of
i is a function from all PWs to the extension (truth value) of S in each PW, i.e.
a characteristic function defming a set of PWs. The intension of a sentence S is
thus the set of PWs in which S is true, also called, in model-theoretic terms, the
proposition S. (Clearly, our notion of proposition is totally different.)
As was pointed out, however, by Dowty et al. (1981:170-175), this leads to
serious problems that may well prove insurmountable for this entire approach.
Verbs like believe, hope, realize are intensional with respect to their embedded
object-clause. In the Standard model-theoretic account this means that the
extension of their embedded object-clause (the that-clause) is the intension of
that clause when it is used äs an independent sentence. Thus, a sentence like:
(1) John believes that Bert lives in Kentucky.
should be true just in case the person called 'John' is an element in the set of
those who believe that Bert lives in Kentucky. 7 contains precisely those entities
who hold that the actual world is an element of the set of PWs (proposition) in
which the sentence Bert lives in Kentucky is true. Sentence (1) thus expresses a
belief-relation between the person called 'John' and the set of PWs in which
Bert lives in Kentucky is true.
The problem is that, in this account, all necessarily true sentences have the
same intension, namely the universe of all PWs, and all necessarily false senten-
ces likewise, namely the null set or 0. This means that the truth conditions for
a sentence where John, or anyone, is said to believe a necessary truth, or a
necessary falsehood, are identical, with the result that sentences like (2a) and
(2b), or (3a) and (3b) should be synonymous, äs (2a,b) both express a belief-
relation between John and the universe of all PWs, whereas (3a,b) both express
a belief-relation between John and the null set:
(2) a. John believes that all bachelors are unmarried.
b. John believes that all circles are round.
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(3) a. John believes that all bachelors are married.
b. John believes that all circles are square.
Yet, äs is universally acknowledged, our John may well believe (2a) but
disbelieve (2b), and likewise for (3a) and (3b). Dowty et al. comment:
We must acknowledge that the problem of propositional attitude sentences is a funda-
mental one for possible world semantics, and for all we know, could eventually turn
out to be a reason for rejecting or drastically modifying the whole possible worlds
framework. (Dowty et al. 1981:175)
The Situation has not changed since the publication of Dowty et al. (1981): the
problem at band has remained unsolved in model-theoretic semantics.
A similar problem occurs with reference to impossible intensional entities,
such äs the living dead man in a ghost story, or the round square cupola referred
to by the fictitious Wyman in Quine's essay On what there is' (Quine 1953:4-
5). Since, by definition, such impossible intensional entities cannot occur in
any possible world, talk about the one would be the same äs talk about the other,
both having identical intensions. But in language this is not so and the
respective expressions are not substitutable salva veritate.
It is no coincidence that PW semantics founders on impossible intensional
entities and either necessary or impossible states of affairs: the products of
human Imagination transcend the Principle of Extensionality, with its axioms of
identity and of consistency and its reduction of qualities to sets, yet they can
still be expressed in natural language.
Similar problems occur with quantification over intensional entities under
intensional predicates (i.e. predicates that do not require real existence of the
argument term referent to produce truth), äs in (4a-d):
(4) a. All goblins are imaginary.
b. Some gods are worshipped there.
c. John talked about some mermaids.
d. John talked about some square circles.
(4b), for example, may well be true without it being necessary to conclude that
there are really existing gods. The reason is that an intensional predicate like be
worshipped can produce truth even if the entity or set of entities to which it
applies does not actually exist.
Restrictions of time and space forbid a further discussion of these compli-
cations (but see Seuren (in preparation) for further comment and a solution in
terms of a theory of intensional quantification). All we can say here is that
humans, with their powers of Imagination, apparently create 'worlds' that defy
the Principle of Extensionality, and that it is apparently possible to speak about
the entities that populate such worlds. That being so, we must conclude that
there is little hope for the programme of extensionalization of intensions.
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There are other problems äs well. For example, model-theoretic semantics
has great difficulty in dealing with cases like:
(5) John thinks that there is a thief in the attic, and he hopes that the
thiefis unarmed.
where the thief John hopes is unarmed must be the same individual äs the thief
he thinks is in the attic, even if, in reality, there may be no thief at all.7
Lexical semantics is likewise highly problematic in the model-theoretic
framework, lexical meaning being drenched with cognitive elements like view-
point, prototypicality, function, emotional attitude, etc. One single example will
suffice, though many could easily be supplied. The English word threshold and
the German word Schwelle have near enough identical extensions in this or any
other possible world. Yet they must differ semantically: whereas Schwelle is
naturally used in the word Verkehrsschwelle to denote a speed-bump, threshold
is totally unfit for such a use, owing, it seems, to a deeply buried difference in
functional viewpoint between the two words.
It is not possible to review the entire field of modern formal semantics in
the present context. The issues involved are of too great a magnitude and com-
plexity. But there is sufFicient reason to give a hearing to those who say that the
incursions of logic into linguistics, much äs they have contributed to a clearer
understanding of the formal and logical aspects involved, have not assigned to
the human cognitive factor its rightful place in the study of language and have
impoverished the philosophical insights about language and cognition that were
coming to fruition around 1900. On the whole, it seems that one must conclude
that even the most advanced forms of model-theoretic semantics, no matter how
ingeniously devised, still fail to account satisfactorily for the truth or falsity of
sentences involving predicates that are intensional with respect to one or more
of their terms, like imaginary, worship, talk about, lookfor, etc. The fault lies
with the principles. Whatever account is presented in model-theoretic terms is,
in the end, both empirically inadequate and failing in generality.
5. Eternal sentences: absence of discourse restrictions
The Principle of Extensionality, with its banning order on psychology, has had
another unfortunate consequence. Most sentences in natural languages are so-
called occasion sentences (the term is Quine's). This means that when they are
presented äs such, written on the blackboard so to speak, it makes no sense to
ask whether they are true or false. A sentence like:
(6) The girl was right after all.
is, of course, a good sentence of English, with its grammatical structure and its
meaning. But it has no Interpretation (in the sense defined in section 2 above)
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and it has no truth value. It will have a truth value once it has been established
between Speaker and listener which girl is intended, what the issue was and at
what time the girl had expressed an opinion on that issue. This means that the
Interpretation of such a sentence is context-dependent, and context-dependency
implies an appeal to cognition well beyond the linguistic Information contained
in the sentence itself.
Not all sentences, however, are occasion sentences. Some are so-called
eternal sentences (again Quine's terminology). These are such that they need no
appeal to context or discourse to have their truth value established. In general,
eternal sentences contain no definite descriptions like the girl: all nominal ex-
pressions are quantified. Moreover, they are either in a generic tense, like (7a),
or the tense operator is itself quantified (e.g. Once upon a time', 'always'), äs
in (7c), or deictically linked with the time of speaking, äs in (7b). Thus the
following are examples of eternal sentences:
(7) a. All humans are mortal.
b. Some Englishmen have a bank account.
c. Once upon a time there was a big bang.
Here it makes perfect sense to ask if these sentences are true or false.
Reference through definite descriptions requires the help of cognition. Sup-
pose John and Harry agree to meet in the pub at five. There are scores of pubs
in the neighbourhood, most of them well-known to both John and Harry. Yet
they know exactly in which pub to meet, that being their usual haunt. Without
that knowledge, they would not know where to meet and the appointment would
come to nothing. This is a general fact about definite determiners like the. The
definite description the pub consists of the definite determiner the and the
predicate/n/6. Predicates have sets of term extensions äs their extension, äs we
have just seen. That being so, the question that presents itself in a model-
theoretic set-up, is how, without any input from outside, the succeeds in singl-
ing out one specific member of the set of all pubs for the purpose of reference.
The answer is that it cannot, unless the set of all pubs contains just one member.
But it may contain many members, äs we have seen. In other words, model-
theory is in principle unable to account for definite reference.
Russell saw this early on in the piece (just äs Aristotle had intuited it, for
which reason he kept definite terms outside his predicate calculus). RusselPs
famous article (1905a) is the first attempt in the literature to account for defi-
nite reference in terms of quantification. The hackneyed sentence:
(8) The present king of France is bald.
served äs RusselPs stock example. He analysed it äs saying 'there is at least one
such that is now king of France and is bald and such that for all y, ify is
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(9) Bx[now[KF(x)] A B(x) A Vy[now[KF(y)] -> y = x]]
(where 'KF' Stands for 'king of France' and 'B' for 'bald'). Russell presented
this analysis in the first place äs a reply to Meinong, that is, äs an attempt to get
rid of reference to non-existing entities like the present king of France (who did
not exist then and does not exist now). But its significance was greatly enhanced
when Quine, in bis (1960), put out bis banning order on all occasion sentences
and declared bis progratnme of the elimination of particulars.
We now see clearly what motivated this programme: logic should stand äs
a monument of metaphysical necessity, unblemished by psychological influ-
ences. Propositions, the primary units of logic, are taken to lead their own
existence, independent of any thought processes. What follows logically, fol-
lows logically, without any outside (least of all psychological) help—in fact,
more or less what Russell wrote in the first passage of bis (1903) quoted in
section 3 above. In this view, the chances of natural language being logically
sound are considered slim, though the logicians will do their best to salvage äs
much of it äs they can.
Against this we posit that propositions, still the primary units of logic, are
mental occurrences of thought. What follows logically, follows formally, i.e. in
terms of the formal truth calculus alone, without any outside (least of all
psychological) help, and there is no a priori reason why occurrences of thought
should or could not be subjected to a formal analysis. The results ofthat ana-
lysis will show to what extent the semantics of natural language can be fitted
into one single formal logical System (i.e. to what extent the semantics of
natural language is compositional), and to what extent it has to rely on a variety
of, possibly large and so far computationally intractable, formal cognitive Sys-
tems mutually connected and interacting with each other.8 A dependency of
language on large and so far computationally intractable cognitive Systems does
not mean that language is 'logically unsound', since there is the realistic possi-
bility that its logic transcends the all too restricted limits of established exten-
sional logico-mathematical Systems. We have here before us a large field of
new and exciting research, the field of cognitive modelling.
6. Critique: a programme of intensional discourse semantics
We think that natural language is intricately bound up with cognition, and for
good functional reasons. There is no earthly reason why the interchange of
messages among humans should be subject to the lofty Standards of meta-
physical necessity. The matter is much more mundane. Humans will do with the
minimum necessary. What is already mutually known or understood need not
be expressed. Instead of speaking in eternal sentences cast in bronze or hewn in
marble, humans cleverly use the resources provided by context and preceding
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discourse, knowing füll well that utterances tend to lead extremely ephemeral
lives, vanishing into thin air once they have been pronounced.
Contrary to established doctrine, we maintain that uttered sentences are in
principle occasion sentences and have no need at all to be dressed up äs eternal
sentences. Eternal sentences, such äs those presented in (7) above, are border-
line cases, whose contextual restrictions happen to be zero.9 We moreover
maintain that the logic of language is intrinsically intensional, and that exten-
sional logic is a borderline case of intensional logic. This will be illustrated in
the following two subsections.
6.1 Anchoring and keying
To say of a sentence that it is an occasion sentence implies that it is fully inter-
pretable only if used in a proper context. Virtually all sentences are uttered in
some given context and are, in fact, made up in such a way that they are only
usable in some discourse domains and not in others.10 We say that an occasion
sentence must be properly anchored in ongoing discourse for it to be inter-
pretable. To account for proper anchoring a mental Discourse Representation or
Discourse Domain (DD) is required, containing the Information accumulated in
preceding discourse in a regimented format. A DD is best seen äs a middle term
kind of memory (between long term and short term memory), probably
specifically designed for the processing of linguistic Information, to which each
new incoming linguistic message is added (incremented), giving rise to an
updated DD. The precise format of a DD is still largely to be specified. Yet it
seems certain that new discourse entities ('addresses') are introduced by means
of an existential quantifier, and that these addresses serve äs anchoring points
for definite descriptions in later sentences. Reference to entities in the world is
mediated by the addresses. Each address Stores whatever properties have been
assigned to the intended world referent during the discourse. Other provisions
must be made, especially with regard to intensional phenomena. A DD must,
for example, open a new intensional subdomain for whatever John is said to
believe in sentence (5) quoted above. And many more mechanisms must be
postulated, which cannot be elaborated here.
The important thing, however, in the present context is the stipulation that
a DD is primarily not a set-theoretic but a qualitative construction. A reduction
of domains and addresses to sets and/or functions misses the point. Addresses
and domains are characterized by properties labelled äs lexical predicates,
whose mostly qualitative satisfaction conditions are specified in the mental
lexicon of each Speaker. Their possible set-theoretic properties matter only when
the properties at issue are of a set-theoretic nature, äs when quantifying
operators like all, some or most are used. A square circle will thus have a DD
representation different from that of a married bachelor or a living corpse. And
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the Statement that all living persons are dead is represented differently from the
Statement that some things run and do not run at the same time, although, in
terms of logic-driven model-theoretic semantics, both have the null set äs their
intension.
A number of recent developments in formal semantics recognize the impor-
tance of the discourse factor in the semantics of natural language.11 This is, of
course, an important step in the direction of an adequate recognition of the role
of cognition in language. Yet the notions developed and the definitions given
are all set-theoretic in nature and not qualitative. The part played by the tools of
set theory is disproportionate in relation to the importance assigned to
cognitively recognized qualities. To give just one, more or less arbitrary,
example, Landman (1986:3) defines afact or Situation äs 'a partial function
mapping w+1-tuples consisting of a (primitive) relation and n objects onto truth
values.' This may or may not be correct from a set-theoretic point of view, but
it misses the point entirely and does not contribute to an adequate insight into
the nature of facts and their role in language and cognition.
Since the matter is of great complexity, and since theoretical progress in
this respect has not so far been very satisfactory, we can only give a global
indication of the conditions to be fulfilled for a sentence to be properly
anchored in a DD. Let us say, by way of indication, that if a sentence S is
properly anchored, then at least the following conditions have been fulfilled:
(a) All definite descriptions and nominal deictic expressions have an
address in the DD at band.
(b) Speech act qualities correspond to special (sub)domains.
(c) Tenses are mapped onto a tense representation model.
(d) Intensional expressions are incremented in intensional subdomains,
themselves provided with satisfaction conditions.
In principle, an unanchored sentence is uninterpretable, although it does
have a meaning. The meaning of an (unambiguous) unanchored, isolated,
sentence-type S is now seen äs a specification in general terms of the effect S
will have when added to any given DD to which S can be anchored, or, in other
words, the meaning ofa sentence S is the Update potential ofS in any suitable
DD. This was, in essence, the formulation used in Seuren (1975:237), but it has
been translated by the progressive semanticists who work with discourse repre-
sentation models in one form or another into the set-theoretic terms of a
function, so that now the meaning of a sentence S is a function from DDs to
updated DDs. Again, this formulation is no doubt correct, but it misses the
point. The point is that the meaning ofa sentence S is a manual or specification
ensuring that when the sentence is used äs a token utterance the property ex-
pressed in the main predicate is assigned to the appropriate addresses in the
domain at hand. It is the mechanics ofthat process, the contents of the manual,
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so to speak, that is the primary interest of the semanticist. To have a notion of
the corresponding mathematical aspects will certainly be useful at certain points
of the enquiry, but it is not the primary purpose.
The overall idea will be clear: discourse domains are postulated äs a cogni-
tive intermediary Station between uttered sentences and what they are about in
the world. In fig. 3 above, the discourse domain is represented äs a succession
of connected thoughts, each containing a proposition that will have a truth value
with regard to the state of affairs in the world to which it is intentionally related.
In principle, a DD that is about the world has the truth value of the conjunction
of all piropositions represented in the main domain of speaker's commitment.
This leads on to the second notion to be discussed in this connection, the
notion of keying. We have established that uttered token sentences need
anchoring in a DD to be interpretable, but we have not said anything about their
relation to the situations in the world and the things occurring in those situations
that they are about. We assume that the relation of a sentence S to the world
Situation it is about is mediated by the DD into which S has been anchored. A
DD may be, and normally is, intentionally related to a particular section of the
world, the veriflcation domain. This relation is called the key, in deference to
the literary notion of a roman a def. Traditional literature is well-anchored, or
eise it would not be intelligible, but it normally lacks a key, except when it is
about things in the world, äs in the case of a roman ä clef
How exactly speaker/writer on the one hand and listener/reader on the other
settle upon a particular verification domain is a largely unexplored question.
Deictic elements, proper names and the use of tenses are no doubt of crucial
importance, but no general account has so far been made available. In any case,
it is only in the intentional relationship of the proposition expressed with regard
to the verification domain that definite terms acquire a reference object and a
proposition acquires a truth value. The imputed direct 'truth' relation between
linguistic utterances and the world, represented by the dotted horizontal line in
Ogden & Richards's semiotic triangle (fig. 1) and made explicit in Standard
model-theoretic semantics, has no place in a causal theory of human linguistic
comprehension.
6.2 Some consequences for ontology
Any discussion of ontological matters should be prefaced with an essential note
of caution. Despite our deeply rooted conviction that we deal with real things
when we deal with the world and that truth is one and indivisible, it must be
recognized that neither true reality nor real truth can be proved. Ever since
Descartes and Kant, competent philosophers have known that the 'thing in
itself' (das Ding an sich) is neither provable nor knowable. What every indi-
vidual knows with undeniable certainty is that he or she has thoughts and emo-
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tions and receives sense data, and, therefore, must exist (Descartes' cogito-
principle). The rest is conjecture and Interpretation. Yet the conjecture and
Interpretation are not arbitrary or open to subjectivist fudging. On the contrary,
Leibniz has taught us, in his coherence theory of truth, that our notions of truth
and reality embody the most consistent and most reliable form of conjecture
and Interpretation available, given the sense data we receive. It seems, in fact,
that humans and other animals have been programmed to deal with sense data
in a way that secures maximal safety and makes for the most reliable predic-
tions, given the mental capacities that each species is endowed with. In other
words, our common version of reality, supplemented with its extension in
science, maximizes, within the limits of our mental powers, our chances of
survival, which is no doubt why we accept it äs reliable and good enough to live
by. What that reality, Out there', really is like, irrespective of our powers of
perception and cognition, is a question that will forever remain unanswered,
though physical theories about the basic structure of matter perhaps provide a
glimpse of what might be expected.
That having been said, we conclude that ontological theories cannot make
claims about what actually is Out there*, but only about the optimal assump-
tions about, or the best construction of, what it is Out there' that causes our
perceptions. In other words, ontology, despite its name, does not give us the
world, but merely the best construction of it. When we appear to be making
claims about what is and what is not, or about what exists and what doesn't, we
are really making claims about the best way of constructing what is or is not, or
about what exists or doesn't. It is the task of ontology to provide a construction
of the world that optimizes correct predictions in the most consistent and sim-
ple possible way. Ontology, in other words, would be just a scientific hypothesis
or theory of the basic and most general features of the world, were it not that the
terms for non-circular realist checking are lacking.
Given this enormous proviso, we say that we will have to include in our
ontology the intensional forms of being so abhorred and despised during the
whole of the 20th Century, from the Russell of 1905 via Quine till the present
day. This we do because, äs we have known since Descartes, the one thing we
know for certain about the world is that thinking takes place. And an adequate
account of thinking requires the assumption of intensional forms of being.
Thinking is, by def inition, the creation of intensional being.
We follow the Russell of 1903, who, in the passage quoted above from his
Principles of Mathematics (1903[37]:449), still distinguished between being
and existence, though we will be a little more careful in describing what
existence entails. Whereas for Russell 'to exist is to have a specific relation
to existence—a relation, by the way, which existence itself does not have'
(1903[37]:449), we prefer to say that humans assign existence to those con-
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structed entities that are, in our construction of the world, reckoned to take part
in physical chains of cause and effect.
A distinction is thus made between entities that exist and those that have
being but do not exist. We accept that human cognition assigns a form of virtual
being to thought-up entities, which are in some sense 'projected' into the world.
Such virtual entities are defined merely by the properties that have been
assigned to them in mental propositional acts.
We enter here upon Meinongian territory. According to Linsky (1967:11-
16), Meinong reserved subsisting (subsistieren) for Objectives', roughly,
reifications and facts, whereas being (bestehen) was used for the ontological
Status of virtual objects (entities), and existing (existieren) for that of really
existing entities. We shall refrain from an attempt at exegesis of Meinong's
texts, which are often very hard to follow, and will follow Linsky's digest.
Having first traced Meinong's intellectual roots to Brentano's psychology
(1967:12), Linsky then says:
... it is certain that Brentano and his followers understood 'intentionality' in such a
way that intentional acts, i.e., mental acts, uniike physical acts, can have non-existent
objects. I can think of Santa Claus, though I cannot shake his hand. It is characteristic
of mental acts that they are 'directed' to objects, but these objects need not exist.
Meinong, äs a follower of Brentano, certainly accepted this. He refined and deepened
Brentano's analysis. In his theory of objects Meinong distinguished between existence
and subsistence, and he protested against our 'prejudice in favor of the actuaP. ...
Referring, uniike hanging, can have a non-existent object. But this is not the same äs
referring to nothing. (Linsky 1967:17-18)
Virtual or intensional entities are incompletely defined, since, being
creatures of Imagination, they only have the properties assigned to them in the
intensional thought domain that was their birth place. We do not know, for
example, whether Sherlock Holmes celebrated his twentieth birthday on his
own or with friends or not at all, but äs soon äs the Sherlock Holmes story cycle
is enriched with a story in which his twentieth birthday is described, that
particular detail will be filled in. It is possible, of course, for there to be two
different stories about that birthday. In that case, Holmes has two incompatible
properties, depending on the thought domain one works with. He may even
have incompatible properties within the same domain. As long äs he does not
have to bear the weight of real existence, he can continue his virtual being even
with incompatible properties adhering to him.
It must be emphasized that talk about Sherlock Holmes is not talk about the
mental representation of Sherlock Holmes. The talk is about the man, even if he
is not a really existing man. We analyse an expression like the fang, when used
äs a referring argument term to a predicate, äs 'the entity such that has been
assigned the property of being a king'. Clearly, this assignment may be false,
but äs long äs it helps to identify the entity in question for the purpose of
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predication (the mental assignment of a property), no härm is done. Thus, the
example (Donnellan 1966:103-104) of the man drinking a martini, which turns
out to refer to a man drinking a glass of water, is not a problem äs long äs the
definite description is merely used referentially, i.e. to single out an entity for
the purpose of predication. And a sentence like:
(10) The present king of France is not a king.
may be judged true, since the entity that has been assigned the property of being
the present king of France does not exist and thus is an intensional entity, and
intensional entities cannot be kings, since to be a king one first has to exist.
In the same manner we shall have to distinguish between extensional and
intensional sets of entities. More precisely, whereas in extensional Systems I is
taken to be the set of all really existing entities in the universe of discourse, we
redefine I äs the total set of all real and/or virtual entities in the universe of
discourse. Then, whereas the notation [[F]] (or [[F(x)]], with the variable
added to indicate the empty syntactic place) is standardly used to denote the set
of really existing entities that satisfy the predicate F (the Standard extension
of F), we redefine [[F(x)]] äs the set of all real and/or virtual entities that
satisfy the predicate F(x). That is, if F(x) is an intensional predicate yielding
truth for intensional entities äs well, such äs the predicate be worshipped,
[[F(x)]] contains all entities, real and/or virtual, that satisfy F(x), or all entities
that are worshipped, no matter whether they exist or are merely virtual. Let us
call this the revised Standard extension of [[F(x)]].
Moreover, we need the notion intensional extension of F, written {F}, or
(F(x)}, standing for the set of all real and/or virtual entities that have had the
property denoted by the predicate F assigned to them, no matter whether
actually satisfies F(x) and no matter whether F(x) is a purely extensional or an
intensional predicate. In 6.3.2 below we will put these notions to good use.
Lastly, we must distinguish between real and intensional facts. In modern
philosophy the notion of fact has caused great problems, which can hardly be
fully discussed in the present context. We cut this Gordian knot by saying,
simply, that a real fact is whatever it is in the world that makes a true propo-
sition true. Real facts, in other words, are truth-makers for propositions. Since
facts are inextricably bound up with propositions, we do not speak of 'facts' per
se, but only of 'the fact that/?', where/? is some proposition. We speak of 'the
fact that /?' after the proposition p has been assigned the value 'true' on the
strength of the best of our constructive and/or inductive cognitive powers.
Since a fact is the world counterpart of a true proposition, one is tempted to
regard the corresponding fact äs the extension of the proposition it makes true,
but then it must be understood that, unlike normal extensions, a fact does not
exist in the world äs a fact without the proposition it makes true. A (real) fact
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may be seen äs a situational datum which is there in the world but whose
ontological form is created by the mental act of putting together a proposition.
From this perspective, facts are reifications, that is, bits of the world not
taken to exist in their own right but taken together by a mental construction or
formula, like the military-industrial complex or the average age of university
Professors in Britain, or the difference between John and Harry. Reifications
are intensional entities of a special kind. Not thought-up entities that may exist
or could exist if the world were different, but thought-up entities whose counter-
part in the real world is to be located with the help of a formula of Interpre-
tation.12 This, clearly, allows for a distinction between extensional and inten-
sional reifications. Extensional reifications are thought-up entities reducible by
a formula of Interpretation to really existing entities in the real world. Inten-
sional reifications are thought-up entities reducible by a formula of Inter-
pretation to intensional entities in some thought-up world.13
We now say that real facts are extensional reifications, while intensional
facts are intensional reifications. In contrast to real facts, we call an intensional
fact whatever U will or would be in the real world that will or would make a
proposition true. We speak of intensional facts äs long äs we are uncertain
about the truth value of the corresponding proposition, or after its falsity has
been established (in which case we can speak of 'the fact that not-/?')· The
distinction between real and intensional facts is obvious: real facts are part of
the actual, real world, whereas intensional facts may or may not be; they are the
product of human Imagination in whatever form. One might think of extending
the notion of existence to facts and say that real facts have existence and
intensional facts have being and perhaps also existence. But such use of these
terms is not advisable (and Meinong agreed, if I have understood him correctly),
äs we think of existing entities äs enduring independently of human thought,
whereas facts 'exist' only in virtue of human thought: no thoughts, no facts. But
we can say that intensional facts are to real facts what intensional entities are to
real entities. (Much of science is concerned with finding out whether the
intensional facts of scientific hypotheses can be said to be real facts, under
some formula of Interpretation or construction.)
Meanwhile, we observe that any theory of discourse semantics will have to
make adequate provisions for addresses that represent facts and other reifica-
tions. So far, no such theory has fulfilled that requirement.
6.3 Some consequences for logic
Even though we realize that we are still far removed from a füll formalization of
the notions that have been presented, we can make a few Statements with regard
to the logical System taken to underlie cognition and language, without pretending
to provide a complete, systematic account of 'the logic of human cognition'.
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Existing logical Systems are insufficient for natural language, which allows
for reference to individuals who can imagine things and work with an ontology
that includes all sorts of imagined scenery and is, therefore, infinitely richer
than the 'desert landscape' so beloved of Quine and bis associates. If a logic is
to account for meaning in natural language it has to be intrinsically intensional,
not the product of a programme of extensionalization of intensions, but, con-
versely, of a programme of intensionalization of extensions. Every utterance
Stands under the intensional operator of the speaker's thought.
6.3. l Presuppositions
First we note that if a sentence can only have a truth value if it has first been
properly anchored in a discourse domain, then the anchoring conditions, i.e. the
presuppositions, of a sentence must be part of its truth conditions. If a sentence
S is not properly anchored, it is uninterpretable and has no truth value, äs in the
case of sentence (6) above. If S is properly anchored, but one or more of the
elements in the discourse domain that make it so are false, then S is intelligible
but false, äs when I say:
(11) Nancy's husband is having an affair.
in a Situation where there is a Nancy and it has been falsely suggested that she
is married. Now (l 1) is properly anchored, because the DD at hand contains an
address for Nancy's husband but the addition of that address to the DD led to
falsity. And, of course, if the increment itself brought about by S leads to falsity,
S is again false, äs when I utter (l 1) in a Situation where Nancy is married, but
her husband is not having an affair.
It appears to make good logical and semantic sense to distinguish between
these two kinds of falsity: if S is false on account of one or more of its presup-
positions being false, we say that S is radically false. If S is false on account of
its own increment leading to falsity in the DD, we say that S is minimally false.14
The main reason why this distinction makes sense is because the normal,
unmarked, negation in natural language appears to leave radical falsity unaf-
fected and to turn minimal falsity into truth and vice versa.
It is a remarkable fact that, despite one or two attempts at accounting for
presuppositions in natural language in terms of model-theoretic semantics (e.g.
Lewis 1979), very little attention has been paid to them in the formal semantic
literature and no satisfactory account has ever been presented there. The subject
of presuppositions has been conspicuous for its absence in that literature. We
now see that there is a good reason for that: any satisfactory theory of pre-
suppositions in natural language will have to bring in the cognitive aspect of
semantic processing, which is something that model-theoretic semantics is not
equipped to do.
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6.3.2 Intensional quantißcation
A second obvious point, in this connection, is quantification. Whereas both
Aristotelian and Russellian predicate calculus only allow for quantification over
really existing entities, we now need to include intensional entities äs well.
To see what is at issue, it is easiest to consider a quantifier äs a predicate
expressing a relation between two sets (i.e. the theory of generalized quan-
tifiers). Restricting ourselves to the two quantifiers that play a dominant role in
logic, we say that the universal quantifier (all or V) expresses an inclusion
relation of one set in another, whereas the existential quantifier (some or )
expresses the fact that the two sets have a non-empty intersection. Thus, the
sentences (12a) and (13a) are analysed logically äs (12b) and (13b), respectively,
expressed in the language of predicate calculus äs (12c) and (13c), respectively:
(12) a. All flags are green.
b. 'the set of flags is included in the set of green things'
c. Vx[G(x), F(x)]15
(13) a. Some flags are green.
b. 'the set of flags and the set of green things intersect non-emptily'
c. Bx[G(x), F(x)]
The predicate Vx (the symbol is added to avoid confusion when more than
one quantifier is involved in the same sentence) is a binary higher order predi-
cate (i.e. it expresses a relation between two sets, not between two individual
entities), and it says that the second set, called the restrictor set and here
symbolized äs 'F(x)' (i.e. the set of all things that have the property of being F),
is included in the first set, called the matrix set, here symbolized äs 'G(x)' (i.e.
the set of all things that have the property of being G). Likewise, the predicate
is a binary higher order predicate saying that the restrictor set and the matrix
set have at least one member in common.
The problem with traditional Aristotelian predicate calculus was that when
the restrictor set is empty (read: consists only of intensional entities), the whole
System collapses. Modern, Russellian, predicate calculus solved that problem
with the help of Standard set theory: when the restrictor set is empty, it is by
definition included in the matrix set, since the null set is a subset of all sets.
Hence, in such cases a universally quantified sentence like:
(14) All mermaids have a bank account.
(where the (empty) restrictor set consists of all mermaids and the matrix set of
all entities that have a bank account) is simply true. Likewise, sentence (15)
will then be considered true:
(15) All mermaids do not have a bank account.
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Here the restrictor set is, äs with (14), the (empty) set of all mermaids, but the
matrix set consists of all entities that do not have a bank account. Since the
empty set is a subset of all sets, both (14) and (15) are considered true in the
terms of Russellian predicate calculus.
This, however, counterintuitive äs it already is, leads to fürther counterin-
tuitive results when applied to intensional predicates like be imaginary > because
now the two sentences (16a) and (16b) should both be true, whereas we, normal
Speakers, clearly feel that (16a) is true and (16b) false:
(16) a. All mermaids are imaginary.
b. All mermaids are not imaginary.
It does seem, therefore, that if justice is to be done to natural language, a provi-
sion will have to be made for quantification over intensional entities. In such a
theory, the quantifiers cannot simply be treated äs binary higher order predi-
cates over sets of really existing entities. The restrictor set will have to be the
intensional extension of the predicate F(x), i.e. {F(x)}, äs defmed above,
whereas the matrix set can be the revised Standard extension of the predicate
G(x), i.e. [[G(x)]], (re)defined in 6.2 above äs the set of all entities, real or
virtual, that actually satisfy the predicate G(x), no matter whether G(x) is an
extensional predicate or an intensional one (such äs be worshipped).
Considering a sentence like:
(17) All unicorns are worshipped.
we now say that (17) is true just in case {Unicorn(x)}, or the set of all real and/
or virtual unicorns, is included in the set [[Be worshipped(x)]], or the set of all
real and/or virtual entities that are worshipped (since be worshipped is an
intensional predicate). Clearly, (17) will be false in case there are any unicorns
(virtual ones, to be sure) that are not worshipped. In Standard extensional predi-
cate calculus, (17) must be considered true simply because there are no uni-
corns. It will require little persuasion that a treatment such äs proposed here is
a great deal subtler and does much greater justice to natural language.16
Moreover, in view of what has been said in 6.3.1 above, an adequate theory
of quantification in natural language will have to take into account presuppo-
sitional phenomena äs well and will have to work with a negation that inverts
truth and minimal falsity but leaves radical falsity unaffected. For a formally
precise attempt at such a theory, see Seuren (in preparation).
7. The cognitive deficiency in linguistics
Having reviewed the cognitive deficiencies of the Standard forms of model-
theoretic semantics, we now turn to what is considered to be linguistics in a
stricter sense, the study of linguistic forms and constructions. Linguistics was
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no exception to the general drive among the human sciences foivscientific Status
that started in the 19th and prevailed throughout the 20th Century. Around the
year 1900, this meant that the human sciences strove to live up to the Standards
set by the then fashionable positivistic notion of science: science was seen
mainly äs an extensive, systematic gathering of verifiable facts, involving only
really existing, preferably material, entities. Scientific Statements regarding
facts should be fully verifiable, which meant among other things that any
abstract or general notions should be fully reducible to material individual
entities and theories were regarded with suspicion. A few decades later, when
neopositivism had succeeded positivism, these requirements were somewhat
relaxed and greater emphasis was placed on predictive theories and on scientific
explanation. After roughly 1960, äs a joint result of developments in the
philosophy of science and of the emergence of Computers, the human sciences
went through the so-called cognitive revolution, which meant that mind and
meaning became fashionable topics again, äs it proved possible and fruitful to
talk about the mind in operational terms drawn from Computer science. This, of
course, was very promising with regard to the cognitive dimension in the study
of language. But how much of that promise actually came to fruition?
It is fair to say that, on the whole, linguistics has always simply followed the
general trends in the philosophy and methodology of science, occasionally
actively contributing, but mostly in a purely passive role. During the late 19th
Century, when linguistics was still equivalent with comparative philology, i.e.
the historical reconstruction of the Indo-European languages and their genetic
relationships, the psychological aspects of language already began to be looked
at with suspicion. Comparative philology constituted a scientific feat of the
highest rank, supported by formally precise analyses and descriptions. But the
human mind äs a factor underlying the structure and use of language was hardly
at issue. In fact, äs we understand from the Young Grammarian Delbrück's
exchange with Wundt in 1901 (Delbrück 1901; Wundt 1901), there was a
distinct wish among the comparative philologists of those days to stay away
from any form of psychological theorizing and stick to purely linguistic
analyses. When, soon after this, the non-historical study of language came off
the ground and became the kind of linguistics we have grown up with, this
aversion to psychology was inherited. Both De Saussure and Bloomfield
insisted on the 'autonomy' of linguistics, wishing to shield linguistics not only
from psychology, but also from logic and philosophy, and even, by that time,
from comparative philology (see Seuren 1998:192-193).
This went well for a time. European structuralism never did much to explore
the relation between language on the one band and mind and meaning on the
other. It simply failed to fill the gap between, on the one hand, observable
linguistic form and, on the other, the cognitive and semantic factors at work in
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language and language use. The psychology appealed to in European linguistics
was mainly folk psychology.
The psychologist-philosopher Karl Bühler, with bis book Sprachtheorie of
1934, was an exception. His primary concern was to explain linguistic struc-
tures in terms of the psychological processes of thought and perception involv-
ed in the use of language, taking into account not only contemporary Gestalt
psychology (which emphasized the fact that a composite object is primarily
perceived äs an organized whole, a 'Gestalt'), but also a wide ränge of philo-
sophical positions. His work, however, had virtually no impact on either Euro-
pean or American linguistics.
Another important exception was the work done in the Prague School with
respect to Vilem Mathesius's (1928) notion ofFunctional Sentence Perspective,
which implied a distinction between, on the one hand, given or old Information
in an uttered sentence, located in the theme or topic, and, on the other, a rheme
or comment expressing the new Information presented. Although this notion
suffered for a number of decades frorn a lack of formal precision, modern
studies in the field of Information structure (in combination with Intonation
studies) are giving it more precision and substance. A link-up with discourse
semantics, äs sketched in section 6 above, would seem natural and potentially
very fruitful.
In phonology, which dominated language studies for a while from 1930 on,
meaning was treated äs a phenomenon that was simply there and could be used,
to some extent, to diiferentiate the functional sound units called phonemes. But
this use of meaning never led to a more basic investigation into the nature of
meaning.
From an overall point of view one may say that, äs the 20th Century pro-
ceeded, mind and meaning were either forgotten or taken for granted in
European linguistics. In fact, it was considered suspect or even unprofessional,
around the middle of the 20th Century, to engage in what was seen äs spe-
culations about such intangible things äs 'mind' or 'meaning'. Appeals to either
psychology or logic were condemned, äs language was considered to be an
autonomous System, capable of Standing on its own legs. At the time, this was
less gross than it may sound now, äs European linguistics was still reeling from
the frustrating discussions around logical, psychological and grammatical
notions of subject and predicate, discussions that had lasted for about eighty
years and had dominated whatever little theoretical talk there was about
language.17 Around 1930 these discussions ended in notional and terminolo-
gical confusion (Seuren 1998:120-133). In general, Europe suffered, in its own
way, from an antimentalistic complex that was more emotional than rational.
In America, things were, though similar, not quite the same. The main
difference was the rise of behaviourism, first limited to psychology proper, then
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spreading to the human sciences in general. American structuralist linguistics
was mainly oriented towards behaviourism, on which it relied to provide the
necessary conceptual grounding. The dominant tendency was to explain mean-
ing in terms of conditioned responses, while the mind was either reasoned away
or reduced to a trivial mechanism of dispositions conditioned by Stimulus
association. One only has to think of chapter 2 in Bloomfield (1933) or of
Skinner's Verbal Behavior (1957). But these attempts to get rid of the really
hard questions relating to language and use of language were soon seen to be
irredeemably inadequate, with the result that they rapidly disappeared from the
agenda with the advent of the cognitive revolution.
Meanwhile, American structuralist linguistics was predominantly antimen-
talistic and antisemantic, culminating in Z. Harris's early work (1951), which
proclaimed the ideal of a theory of language, without any appeal to meaning. In a
sense, this development was extremely fruitful. The exclusive focusing on
linguistic form made linguists see that grammatical constructions are subject to an
intricate System of restrictions or 'rules', which together define the identity of a
language. Linguists like Zellig Harris and Charles Hockett, moreover, made a
connection with newly developed branches of mathematics, in particular the theory
of algorithms, which provided a deeper and more general insight into the properties
of rule Systems, or grammars, which define the structural possibilities of strings of
Symbols in a language. It was thus that the theory of generative grammar developed
in the school of Zellig Harris during the late 1940s and early 1950s.
In the early days of generative grammar, a grammar was seen äs an algorith-
mic random generator of sentences, meant to be able to produce any one of the
infinite set of wellformed sentences of the language at issue, regardless of their
(finite) length, and unable to produce any illformed string of morphemes.18
Within a few years, however, this abstract, formal theory of grammars was
assigned a realist Interpretation: during the early 1960s an algorithmic genera-
tive grammar came to be seen äs a model of the native Speaker's linguistic
competence, that is, bis ability to use wellformed and to avoid illformed
sentences. Understandably, it did not take long for it to be realized that, ob-
viously, a native speaker's competence involves more than just the ability to
produce wellformed and to avoid illformed sentences. It was proposed (Katz &
Fodor 1963; Katz & Postal 1964) that a so-called 'semantic component' should
be added to the generative grammatical model that was current in those days.
This semantic component should, in principle, 'projecf syntactic structures onto
a semantic representation, thus accounting for the fact that sentences have a
meaning and that competent Speakers are not only able to produce syntactically
wellformed sentences but also know what they mean.
It is fairly obvious that the call for a 'semantic component' during the early
1960s was a consequence of the cognitive revolution in psychology and adjacent
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human sciences. In fact, virtually all theories of grammar that have seen the
light since 1960 one way or another take meaning into account.
The Chomskyan tradition, which went from the so-called 'Extended Stan-
dard Theory' of 1970 to the Minimalist Programme of 1995, adopted the notion
of 'logical form', thereby paying its tribute to semantics without, however, doing
anything about it.19 By contrast, the Generative Semantics movement, which
came about during the late 1960s but was nipped in the bud during the 1970s,
contained the promise of bringing the study of grammar a great deal closer to
the ideal of psychological plausibility and of accounting for the semantic
aspects of language in a truly cognitive fashion. In fact, it conquered the world
even more quickly than the random generator model had done a decade earlier.
But although its research programme was clear and the chances of success were
realistic, äs was appreciated by vast numbers of linguists all over the world, it
was never given a fair chance, due to sociological factors within the Community
of linguists that had little to do with academic merit or argument.20
As it is, the Chomskyan tradition in generative grammar has lagged behind
most other theories of grammar in that its interest in semantics and cognition
has amounted to little more than lip service. The fact that this tradition still
clings to a random generator view of grammar shows the lack of realism of its
Claims to a realist cognitive Interpretation. In general, this approach is charac-
terized by a disquieting contrast between, on the one hand, its ambitious
theoretical goals and, on the other, its shaky empirical support (despite frequent
claims or suggestions in Chomsky 1995 of empirical results already achieved or
still under way in 'promising work', without them ever being identified).21
Other theories take semantics more seriously. Categorial Grammar consti-
tutes the most forceful and systematic attempt at maintaining direct surface
structure semantics, without the Intervention of a separate level of semantic
representation. Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar (GPSG) (Gazdar et al.
1985), and its successor Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG)
(Pollard & Sag 1994), Tree Adjoining Grammars (TAG) (Joshi 1987), and many
other theories, each define the relation of surface structure to semantic Inter-
pretation in their own way, which it would take too long to discuss in the present
context. Implicitly or explicitly, most present-day grammatical theories con-
sider a grammar to be a mediator between sound and meaning. This in itself is
undoubtedly an important step forward. Yet the semantics used in these theories
is predominantly of the Montagovian model-theoretic kind which, äs we have
seen above, is empirically not viable due to its cognitive inadequacies. These
theories have no window on the cognitive world of thought, which rather limits
their relevance for a proper insight into the nature of language.
The only modern theory of grammar that makes a direct and explicit appeal
to cognition is Cognitive Grammar (e.g. Langacker 1987, 1991), for which rea-
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son this development merits special attention in the present context. This theory
is primarily motivated by considerations of psychological plausibility and aims
at a füll reduction of human language to the general principles of human cogni-
tion. In so far äs this initiative manifests a desire to integrate the study of lan-
guage into the study of cognition, it is certainly to be applauded, äs there is no
denying that human language is indeed primarily a cognitive phenomenon. And
some positive results have certainly been achieved. Any fair observer will have
to agree that the Cognitive Grammar approach has booked considerable suc-
cesses in the field of lexical semantics, where füll recognition is granted to such
essential factors äs viewpoint, functionality, prototypicality and the like, thus
showing the basic inadequacy of extensionalist approaches to lexical meaning.
It is no coincidence that formal semantics has conspicuously failed in the field
of lexical semantics.
As regards grammar, however, Cognitive Grammar appears to overshoot its
purpose in assuming that the principles of grammar are just instances of general
cognitive principles. While this might seem a priori plausible and methodo-
logically preferable (äs an application of Ockham's razor), present-day knowl-
edge of grammatical structures and processes does not support such a view.
Linguists have learned, over the past half Century, that the nature of the
grammatical data that are available today is such that a formally precise system
of grammar is required äs their explanatory source. Despite the vast differences
of opinion among the various schools regarding the principles and rules that are
taken to make up the grammar Systems of the world's languages, there appears
to be an overall agreement that those principles and rules are only remotely
related to, or governed by, general principles of cognition, if at all. Where
grammatical analyses have been most successful, across the difFerent schools,
no similarity with any known general cognitive principle can be pointed out.
A few examples may illustrate this. Consider the phenomenon of Aux-
attraction (or Subject-Aux Inversion) äs a corollary of constituent preposing in
the Germanic languages. In English, this phenomenon is restricted to the
preposing of non-subject WH-question constituents (including the zero instance
occurring with yes/no questions), and of negative and seminegative consti-
tuents. In German and Dutch Aux-attraction occurs with any non-subject
constituent preposing (including overt and covert WH-constituents). Some
interesting and valuable cognitivist literature (e.g. Kuteva 2001) has been
published recently on the subject of auxiliation, providing support for the view
that auxiliation äs a historical process (cp. M. Harris & Ramat 1987) is
cognitively functional. Yet the strictly grammatical question of how exactly
auxiliation is implemented in the grammatical Systems of the languages
concerned is not, or only sketchily, answered. This question is answered by
formal grammarians, who have come up with a variety of analyses. These
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analyses, however, show no possible link with general cognitive principles and
more often than not they impress one äs being communicatively dysfunctional
(to the extent that communicative fünctionality can be gauged).
Another example is provided by phenomena of verbal clustering in nume-
rous languages.22 V-clustering is manifest, for example, in German and Dutch,
which have clauses like (18a) or (18b), both meaning 'because I could have let
the man deliver the book to me' (the V-clusters are indicated):
(l8) a. ... weil ich den Mann mir das Buch v[hätte besorgen lassen können]
b. ... omdat ik de man mij het boek v[had können laten bezorgen]
It is fairly obvious that such a construction, where all NPs of different ranks are
aligned on the left and all verbs of diiferent ranks are clustered on the right
(with occasional leaps in ordering directionality), can hardly be considered
communicatively functional or cognitively motivated. Yet that is how some
languages encode the underlying meaning. It does not seem that Cognitive
Grammar has much to say here, which invites the conclusion that formal
grammar remains necessary, next to a broader investigation of the links that
exist between language and Open' cognition.
The large number of cases of descriptive success on the basis of 'autono-
mous' grammatical rules and principles has convinced most theoretical gram-
marians that, barring lexical selection, the processes that convert semantic
structures (thoughts) into sound and vice versa are cognitively encapsulated (äs
indicated in fig. 3 above). This means that they are automatic routines, screened
off frorn introspection or awareness and not open to conscious interference by
the Speaker (see for example eh. 2 in Seuren 2001). They are, in other words, in
some sense modular (though the physical correlate of this form of modularity
is still unknown).
The assumption of modularity for the grammatical machinery mapping
semantic structures onto sounds and vice versa does not contradict the in-
sistence on the cognitive dimension. On the contrary: encapsulated modular
routines are well-known in the study of cognition. In fact, for good functional
reasons, most of the ancillary work done in or by cognition takes place 'under-
ground', way beyond any conscious access. Had this not been so, even a small
cognitive effort would risk to blow up the System, äs the processes that are open
to awareness are extremely costly in terms of brain space, operating time and
memory. No functional purpose is served by making ancillary tasks open to
conscious inspection.
If grammar is seen äs an ancillary mechanism (and there appears to be no
reason why it should not be so considered), it makes sense to accept the view
that grammar is a purpose-built routine procedure, separate from the principles
and procedures that guide the mental operations that are more open to aware-
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ness. In rejecting this view, Cognitive Grammar pays the price of insufficient
formal precision. Its explanatory principles äs well äs its predictions are too
often intuitive and not open to precise testing (difficult enough äs that is in
linguistics). It excels in pointing out often subtle semantic differences (the
semantics being open to control and awareness), but fails systematically to show
the general cognitive relevance of assigning specific syntactic or morphological
Status to morphemes or constructions, äs indeed it is badly lacking in specifying
the precise properties of syntactic or morphological structures. The result is an
antiformalist attitude in grammar and semantics, which has severely limited the
relevance of Cognitive Grammar in these areas.
Moreover, Cognitive Grammar fails to tackle the philosophical and metho-
dological issues that have been raised in the present paper. Given the stringency
of the arguments and the depth of the issues involved, this cannot be done with
impunity. If the cognitive grammarians could be persuaded to take matters of
truth and falsity, logic, and philosophical questions of being and existence, to
mention just a few, more seriously, they might change their attitude with regard
to formal theories and the modularity of grammar, and thus give greater weight
and substance to their claims.
Perhaps, the overall conclusion must be that, while most contemporary the-
ories of grammar and meaning appear to be in a phase where often serious and
promising attempts are made to integrate the study of language into that of
cognition, it is not generally recognized that one has to go back to the very
ontological and epistemological foundations of logic and language if a real
cognitive revolution in the study of language is to be brought about. A philo-
sophically and formally solid account is needed of the fact that natural lan-
guage, like natural thinking, is basically intensional. Such a study will then
provide the basis for a principled theory of semantic structure, and thus for a
principled theory of grammar, the mechanism that maps semantic structures
and physical linguistic utterances onto each other.
Notes
This paper was presented, in a shortened form, äs the Presidential Address at the annual
meeting of the Societas Linguistica Europaea at Leuven University on August 28, 2001.
Even though fig. 3 shows a more elaborate architecture than fig. 2, it is still far from
complete. For example, the double arrow between "LEXICON PLUS GRAMMAR" and "SURFACE
STRUCTURE" is, in all likelihood, a gross simplification. Whereas the top-down arrow may
be justified in that the generation process, given a well-defined thought structure äs input,
has many of the characteristics of an insulated algorithmic procedure, the bottom-up
process of parsing seems much less straightforward. Since the parsing process appears to
be much more dependent on outside inputs from context and general cognition, one may
assume that it is less insulated and, in principle, non-compositional. Other elements in fig.
3 suffer from similar defects. In the present context, however, we must refrain from any
attempt at rendering such details visible in the schematic architecture.
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2 I am indebted to my Student Cor Burger for helping me sort out this particular episode.
3 See, for example, his brazen Statement in Russell (1957:389): *I agree, however, with Mr
Strawson's Statement that ordinary language has no exact logic.'
4 One remembers Quine's slogan: *No entity without identity.' For a substantial critique of
this Quinean principle, see Strawson (1997).
5 Russell writes (1905a:485): *Yet if we enumerated the things that are bald, and then the
things that are not bald, we should not find the present king of France in either list.
Hegelians, who love a synthesis, will probably conclude that he wears a wig.' The quip is,
of course, rhetorically powerful. Yet Meinong would reply (other man Russell's Hegelians)
that the non-existent king of France will be found in the list of things that are not bald,
since to be really bald one first has to exist. Remarkably also, Russell is happy with the
fact that in his predicate calculus All present kings of France are bald and AH present kings
of France are not bald are true at the same time when there is no king of France, whereas
he ridicules the position that The present king of France is bald and The present king of
France is not bald could be considered true at the same time in cases where there is no
such king. See Linsky (1967) for informed comment.
6 See in particular Montague's extremely influential paper (1973).
7 To say that hope-worlds are a subset of belief-worlds will not do, äs shown by, for
example:
(i) John doesn't think there is a thief in the attic, but he hopes that if there is one, the
man will be unarmed.
8 Both the theory and the practice of automatic translation have shown that meaning cannot
be determined compositionally: if it could, there would now be adequate machine trans-
lation programs. Any competent translator knows that to translate a text properly one has
to have knowledge of what the text is about. This applies not only to technical texts, where
the knowledge requirement is usually highly obvious, but also to non-technical texts,
where this requirement is often hidden by the triviality of the knowledge required.
9 The same point is made in Barwise & Perry (l983:5-6) (where the curious terms 'efficient'
and 'nonefficient' are used for 'occasion' and 'eternal', respectively). Seuren et al. (2001)
gives extensive arguments for the position that occasion sentences are the norm and eternal
sentences are mere borderline cases.
10 In Seuren (1985) and elsewhere it is argued extensively that these anchoring conditions
are in effect what is usually called the presuppositions of a sentence; this aspect will be
taken up again in section 6.3 below.
11 See, for example, Kamp (1981), Barwise & Perry (1983), Veltman (1985), Landman
(1986), Groenendijk & Stokhof (1991), Kamp & Reyle (1993).
12 If the formula of Interpretation is vague or ill-defined, so is the reification. Vague
reifications are common, but a threat to clear thinking.
13 As I understand it, Meinong called the form of being of extensional reifications subsisting.
He apparently had no term for the form of being of intensional reifications.
14 For extensive discussion of the logical and semantic technicalities and the corroborating
empirical observations, see for example Seuren (1985, 2000), Seuren et al. (2001).
15 The notation normally used is: ,,x[F(x), G(x)]} with the restrictor set first and the matrix
set second. For reasons to do with the grammatical processing of predicate calculus
formulae I prefer the notation äs used in the text.
16 Informed readers will, of course, refer to Montague (1973), where sentences like John
talks about a unicorn are analysed in his possible world framework. The answer to this is
that in such an analysis the sentences John talks about a square circle and John talks
about a married bachelor have identical truth conditions, which is an unacceptable result
for the semantics of natural language. Given the basic premisses of possible world
semantics, it does seem that this defect cannot be repaired, just äs the problem signalled
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above in connection with (2) and (3) has so far proved unsolvable in that framework. That
being so, one may well feel justified in not wishing to spend the inordinate amount of time
and energy needed for a füll command of Montague's extremely complex formal Systems.
17 But for De Saussure, who had given the example of not mentioning the subject-predicate
debate at all.
18 The term mndom genemtor was first introduced in Yngve (1962), in a mathematically
oriented context to which the critique formulated here does not apply at all. Chomsky
rejects the term on the grounds that his 'generative' theory of grammar should not be seen
äs a competence model, but only äs an abstract characterization of the sentences of a
language. In light of his purported realism, however, this is disingenuous, since non-
algorithmic 'abstract characterizations' are^er se not amenable to a realist Interpretation,
äs their descriptive power is based on logical, not on causal entailments, whereas any
realist theory must make an appeal to causal factors. Any realist theory of grammar,
therefore, must be interpretable äs defining real time generative processes, i.e. äs an
implementable algorithm. When Chomsky's generative theory of grammar (in any of its
appearances) is formulated äs an algorithm, äs he himself does when he tries to achieve
formal precision, it appears immediately that the process of sentence production is totally
unrestricted. Factors of intended meaning, order of statistical frequency, or whatevever,
play no role at all. It is this notion of 'random generator' that is at issue here.
19 In fact, äs was pointed out by Johnson & Lappin (1997), the 'logical form' invoked in
Chomsky (1995) is totally undefined, and, to the extent that one catches a glimpse of what
may actually be intended, semantically absurd.
20 For detailed accounts of this stränge episode, see R. Harris (1993), Huck & Goldsmith
(1995), Seuren (1998:512-527). Newmeyer (1980) is clearly partisan, äs shown in
McCawley (1980).
21 It would seem that whatever useful analyses or descriptions have been presented in this
framework can profitably be reformulated in terms of more sedate and better founded
formalisms.
22 Cp. for example Bech (1983), Starosta (1971), Seuren (1972), Langacker (1973), Evers
(1975), Rambow (1994), Hinrichs et al. (1998).
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